

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 165856  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY PM/NPP:GGOPLINGER:JMM  
APPROVED BY S/AS:AMBASSADOR SMITH  
S/AS - MR. FARLEY  
S/P - MR. KAHAN  
OES/NET - MR. DEVINE  
ACDA - MR. VAN DOREN  
ERDA:MR.SEIVERING  
T - DR. NYE  
S/S-O:LRMACFARLANE

-----079602 152330Z /61

P 152239Z JUL 77  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 165856

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:XGDS-3

TAGS: MNUC, TECH, PARM, FR

SUBJECT: NON-PROLIFERATION EXPERTS MEETING

FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF PAPER PROVIDED TO  
AMBASSADOR SMITH BY GIRAUD:

QUOTE

1. DURING THE LONDON SUMMIT MEETING THE CHIEFS OF STATE  
AGREED ON THE NECESSITY OF DEVELOPING NUCLEAR ENERGY IN  
ORDER TO HELP MEET THE WORLD'S ENERGY NEEDS. THEY  
COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO DOING SO WHILE REDUCING THE RISKS

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OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

2. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT IN ORDER TO BE EFFECTIVE, NONPRO-  
LIFERATION POLICIES WOULD HAVE TO BE AS ACCEPTABLE AS  
POSSIBLE BOTH TO INDUSTRIALIZED AND TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.  
TO THAT END THEY DECIDED TO CARRY OUT A PRELIMINARY  
ANALYSIS ON THE BEST MEANS OF ADVANCING TOWARD THOSE

OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING A STUDY OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE FUEL CYCLE.

3. THAT PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS, WHICH ACCORDING TO THE DECISIONS REACHED AT LONDON WAS TO BE COMPLETED BY JULY 9, IS PRESENTED IN WHAT FOLLOWS.

ALL THE DELEGATIONS RECOGNIZE THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING AND CONSTANTLY IMPROVING AIEA SAFEGUARDS AND OF SUBJECTING THEIR NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO SUCH SAFEGUARDS. HOWEVER, SOME DO NOT CONSIDER THAT ENOUGH AND REFUSE TO COUNTENANCE NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO NON-NUCLEAR STATES THAT HAVE NOT PLACED THEIR ENTIRE FUEL CYCLE UNDER SUCH SAFEGUARDS AND ARE NOT ALSO WILLING TO SUBJECT THEIR REPROCESSING OF THE IRRADIATED FUELS TO THE SUPPLIER'S VETO. OTHERS CONSIDER THAT SUCH COMMITMENTS SHOULD BE OBTAINED BY PERSUASION RATHER THAN BY THREATENING TO INTERRUPT TRADE, AND THAT PUTTING PRESSURE ON COUNTRIES' ENERGY POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO REPROCESSING SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

ALL THE DELEGATIONS CONSIDER THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES REDUCING THE RISK OF PROLIFERATION REQUIRES THAT THE VARIOUS CONSUMER COUNTRIES FEEL ASSURED OF SUFFICIENT NUCLEAR FUEL TO SATISFY THEIR NEEDS UNDER ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY SATISFACTORY CONDITIONS OF SUPPLY.

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HOWEVER, CURRENTLY CONFIRMED URANIUM RESERVES AMOUNT TO 1.8 MILLION TONS, AND DIFFICULTIES IN EXPLOITING AND EXPORTING THEM CAST UNCERTAINTY ON A LARGE PART OF THEM. THE PARTIES THEREFORE PROPOSE TO STUDY JOINTLY THE VARIOUS MEANS OF INCREASING URANIUM FOR THE BENEFIT OF CONSUMERS. (SEE ITEM 1B OF THE PROGRAM.)

THEY ALSO PROPOSE TO STUDY HOW USERS OF ENRICHED URANIUM COULD BE ASSURED OF HAVING THEIR NEEDS MET, EITHER BY SUPPLIES FROM COUNTRIES WITH ENRICHMENT CAPACITY OR BY CONSTRUCTION OF NEW CAPACITY. IN THE FIRST CASE CONSUMERS SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT THERE WILL BE NO WORLD SHORTAGE AND THAT THEY CAN KEEP A FREEDOM OF CHOICE BETWEEN VARIOUS SUPPLIERS. (SEE ITEM 2A OF THE PROGRAM.)

IN ADDITION, THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW ENRICHING CAPACITY OUGHT NOT TO ENCOURAGE DISSEMINATION OF THE TECHNOLOGIES MOST DANGEROUS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PROLIFERATION. A COMPARISON OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DIFFERENT PROCEDURES FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW WOULD BE USEFUL (SEE ITEM 2B). FURTHERMORE, THE AVAILABILITY AND STORAGE OF HIGHLY

ENRICHED URANIUM SHOULD BE STRICTLY REGULATED AND CONTROLLED.

IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO SEE IF MULTINATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS COULD BE ESTABLISHED TO GUARANTEE URANIUM OR ENRICHED URANIUM SUPPLIES IN THE EVENT OF A SUDDEN BREAK IN SUPPLIES. (SEE ITEM 3.)

THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY IS CURRENTLY ORGANIZED AROUND URANIUM AS THE PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND REQUIRES STORAGE OF LONG-TERM RADIOACTIVE WASTE AFTER REPROCESSING OF THE IRRADIATED FUELS AND PROPER HANDLING OF THE WASTE. THIS OPERATION MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO RECOVER UNPROCESSED URANIUM AS WELL AS PLUTONIUM. THE RESULT IS MULTIPLICATION  
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BY A FACTOR OF 2 OF ENERGY MADE AVAILABLE IF THE PLUTONIUM IS RECYCLED IN THERMAL REACTORS AND BY A FACTOR OF 50 TO 60 IF IT IS USED IN BREEDER REACTORS.

ALL THE DELEGATIONS CONSIDER THAT THE RISK OF PROLIFERATION WILL BE SMALLER IF THE DISSEMINATION OF PLUTONIUM CAN BE PREVENTED. BUT NO AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED YET ON THE BEST WAY OF DEVELOPING NUCLEAR ENERGY WHILE PREVENTING THE DISSEMINATION OF PLUTONIUM.

SOME COUNTRIES (A) CONSIDER THAT THE IRRADIATED FUELS SHOULD NOT BE REPROCESSED, SO THAT NO PLUTONIUM WOULD EVER BE EXTRACTED FROM THEM. OTHER COUNTRIES (B) CONSIDER THAT A PROHIBITION AGAINST REPROCESSING IS NOT FEASIBLE, FOR TWO REASONS. THE FIRST IS BASED ON ECOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS: AT PRESENT WE DO NOT KNOW HOW TO STORE IRRADIATED FUELS OVER THE LONG TERM; IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT WE WILL SUCCEED, AND PROVISIONAL STORAGE OF THOSE FUELS--FOR WHICH THE INDUSTRY IS CURRENTLY NOT EQUIPPED--INCREASES THE RISKS RUN AT THE TIME OF REPROCESSING. THE SECOND REASON IS THAT CONFIRMED URANIUM RESERVES DO NOT PERMIT NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT TO THE EXTENT NEEDED IF THE URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM WHICH COULD BE RECYCLED ARE WASTED.

THOSE OBJECTIONS ARE NOT IGNORED BY THE (A) COUNTRIES, WHICH PROPOSE TWO SERIES OF MEASURES TO DEAL WITH THEM. THEY RECOMMEND ON THE ONE HAND THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF LONG-TERM STORAGE OF UNPROCESSED IRRADIATED FUELS BE ACTIVELY STUDIED, AND ON THE OTHER HAND THAT ALL MEANS OF DEALING WITH GREATLY INCREASED URANIUM CONSUMPTION BE EXAMINED. A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN ADVANCED; INCREASE THE COMBUSTION RATE OF URANIUM IN CURRENT REACTORS, USE ANOTHER NUCLEAR MATERIAL, THORIUM, AND POSSI-  
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BLY DEVELOP OTHER TYPES OF BREEDERS WHICH WOULD NOT MAKE PLUTONIUM AVAILABLE.

THE (B) COUNTRIES POINT OUT THAT THOSE IDEAS ARE NOT NEW AND THAT THEIR LIMITS CAN BE QUICKLY DEFINED. THEY CONSIDER THAT THOSE IDEAS WOULD UPSET EXISTING NUCLEAR CAPACITY, THAT THEIR ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ARE UNFORESEEABLE BUT MAY BE EXTREME, AND THAT THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF ENERGY SUPPLIES. MOREOVER, THE

MEASURES THAT WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW DO NOT EXCLUDE THE USE OF OTHER SENSITIVE MATERIALS LIKE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND URANIUM 233--OR EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF PLUTONIUM.

ALL THE DELEGATIONS ARE THUS IN AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE STUDY OF MEASURES MAXIMIZING THE PREVENTION OF PLUTONIUM DISSEMINATION: LIMIT THE NUMBER OF REPROCESSING PLANTS AND ENSURE THAT THEY ARE SITUATED IN CAREFULLY CHOSEN LOCATIONS, THAT THEY MEET ADEQUATE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AND THAT THEY ARE PLACED UNDER APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS.

PLUTONIUM MUST NOT BE EXTRACTED IN SUCH PLANTS IN EXCESS OF THE AMOUNT JUSTIFIED.

PLUTONIUM MUST BE STORED IN REPROCESSING PLANTS OR IN APPROPRIATE CENTERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL.

PLUTONIUM MUST BE TRANSPORTED ONLY IN FORMS WHICH MAKE ITS RECOVERY EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, IF POSSIBLE AS DIFFICULT AS WHEN STARTING WITH IRRADIATED FUELS.

ALL THOSE MEASURES COULD BE STUDIED ON A PRIORITY BASIS AND IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT DELAY. (SEE ITEM 4.) IN ANY EVENT IT MUST BE MADE POSSIBLE FOR INDUSTRIAL REPROCESSING  
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CESSING OPERATIONS ALREADY PLANNED AND BREEDER REACTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS CONNECTED WITH ALREADY DECIDED FUEL CYCLE POLICIES TO GO FORWARD DURING SUCH A STUDY, THE RESULTS OF WHICH CANNOT BE FORETOLD AT PRESENT.

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SUCH A COMPARATIVE STUDY COULD ANALYZE EACH OF THE ALTERNATIVES PROPOSED TO DETERMINE ITS ABILITY TO MEET ENERGY NEEDS AND REDUCE THE RISKS OF PROLIFERATION. (SEE ITEMS 6, 7, 8, IA, ID, 5.) UNQUOTE

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DRAFTED BY: OES/NET/RD: JBDEVINE: LMT

APPROVED BY: OES/NET: LVNOSENZO

T/D-ED MCGAFFIGAN

S/S-TGMARTIN

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O 211615Z JUL 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 165856

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 165856 ACTION PARIS JULY 15.

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 165856

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E.O. 11652:XGDS-3

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## Message Attributes

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**Litigation History:**  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
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**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** NON-PROLIFERATION EXPERTS MEETING FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF PAPER PROVIDED TO AMBASSADOR SMITH BY GIRAUD  
**TAGS:** MNUC, TECH, PARM, FR  
**To:** PARIS  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvkey:** odbcr://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/2534c06a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
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22 May 2009  
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